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To account for the formation of employment-welfare relationship, conventional studies often rely 
on the demand-side or the supply-side perspective. To explain the complete mechanism in the observed 
nexus, however, I argue that a political institution and its historical path need to be investigated. By 
examining youth employment policy in Canada, this paper explores how the strategy of integrating 
social welfare policy with active labor market policy targeting youth ended up with potentials for 
unilateral action, both at the federal and provincial levels, how the subsequent centralizing force 
undermined the devolution efforts and the ensuing reform in accordance with neo-liberal framework in 
labor market policy, how political institutions in a federal state came to affect the phase of 
employment-welfare relationship, and ultimately why such a center-governed active labor market 
policy often falls short of realizing its intended objective of transforming the existing nexus between 
welfare state and production regime. 
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In democratic systems, getting things done, i.e. effectiveness, without attaining 
legitimacy is a vacuous concept, especially if constituents are deeply divided over the proper 
delimitation of government. In Canada, the reverse phenomenon is rather common in that 
two incompatible visions of political community coexist: the French-speaking Quebecers 
who interpret federalism as “multination” federalism and most English-speaking Canadians 
and French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec who define federalism as “territorial” 
federalism.
1
 Consequently, two legitimate but possibly less effective political systems exist 
and the two parties to the federal compact cannot agree on the precise terms of the union. 
Thus, when one side imposes its notion of political community upon the other in anticipation 
of keeping the Canadian union together, such quests are bound to aggravate the conflict.  
                                                          
 This work was supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government 
(MOEHRD, Basic Research Promotion Fund) (KRF-2006-074-BM0008). An earlier draft of this 
paper was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 64th Annual National Conference, 
Chicago, 20, April, 2006. 
1 “For national minorities like the Québécois, federalism is first and foremost a federation of peoples, 
and decisions regarding the powers of federal subunits should recognize the equal status of the 
founding peoples. On this view, to grant equal powers to regional-based units and nationality-based 
units is in fact to deny equality to the minority nation, by reducing its status to that of a regional 
division within the majority nation. By contrast, for English-speaking Canadians, federalism is first 
and foremost a federation of territorial units, and decisions regarding the division of powers should 
affirm the equality of the constituent units” (quoted from Kymlicka 1998).  
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When and if the demand for devolution rears its head, the normal assumption is that 
subnational governments are better suited for the task, be it the delivery of active labor 
market services or training. Intergovernmental shifts in labor market policy, represented by 
the Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs) in Canada, are one of the latest and 
a potentially significant transformation in the intergovernmental relations: Responsibilities 
are set to transfer from the federal to the provincial orders of government. Conventionally, 
because there was little material incentive for employers and employees alike to pay for on-
the-job training in Canada, institutional training, predominantly supported by provincial 
governments, has been dominant (Klassen 2001: 164). However, the federal government, at 
times, has been vocal about its role in active labor market policy, especially since the 1960s. 
As the degree of intergovernmental disagreement over integration of active labor market 
policy and social welfare policy into youth employment policy mounted over the years, the 
corresponding reforms on employment-welfare nexus became difficult for multiple levels of 
government to implement. Yet there seems a variation in the capacity of a federal system to 
undertake such reforms as seen later in a comparative context, as well as within the same 
country over different periods as will be discussed in details about Canada. The odds of 
successful reform policies, then, arguably depend on a degree of operational bargaining 
between the orders of government involved. 
By examining youth employment policy in Canada, this paper explores how the strategy 
of integrating social welfare policy with active labor market policy targeting youth ended up 
with potentials for unilateral action, both at the federal and provincial levels, how the 
subsequent centralizing force undermined the devolution efforts and the ensuing reform in 
accordance with neo-liberal framework in labor market policy, how political institutions in a 
federal state came to affect the phase of employment-welfare relationship, and ultimately 
why such a center-governed active labor market policy often falls short of realizing its 
intended objective of transforming the existing nexus between welfare state and production 
regime. In doing so, I will examine how and why the current strategy of integrating social 
welfare policy with education policy in accordance with a neo-liberal framework often ran 
short of contributing to the elusive social union in Canada. The rest of the paper consists of 
the following sections: 1) selective literature reviews on federalism, social welfare policy, 
and labor market policy, 2) labor market policy, youth employment policy and federalism in 
Canada, and 3) conclusion. 
 
 
2. HOW FEDERALISM AFFECTS SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LABOR 
MARKET POLICY: LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1. Federalism and Social Welfare Policy 
 
“Political institutions do matter, but in interaction with other factors … Governments there 
[in power fragmented systems] … are encouraged to adopt negotiated solutions to welfare 
problems characterized by the inclusion of quid pro quos targeted on key actors. The result is 
that the political risks are reduced, but at the same time their control over the content of reform 
is limited …” (Bonoli in Pierson 2000: 264). 
 
As witnessed above, there seems to be a conventional agreement that constitutional 
decentralization inevitably leads to lower levels of social provision because the federal 




government under conditions of multi-level governance tends to opt for a more restrained 
role in social policy expansion. The theoretical arguments linking decentralization with 
conservative social provision are: 1) competition among jurisdictions contributes to 
constraints on social programs mainly because generous social programs act as “welfare 
magnets” and deter prospective enterprises and laborers,
 
2) vested business interests in 
provinces, the ideological/policy orientation of provincial political elites, and/or provincial 
political cultures drive provincial governments to be less progressive than the federal 
government, or 3) more veto players make it easier to effectively block the actions of others 
such that social policy expansion is slower (Hicks and Swank 1992: 658-674; Bonoli 2001: 
245-247; Swank 2001: 210-212; Rothstein and Steinmo 2002: 6-15; Korpi 2003). 
Whatever the logical explanation may be, the final outcome is seemingly identical: 
federalism leads to conservative social provision. 
However, there seems to be a caution against such a sweeping conclusion and its 
indiscreet application. Particular policy areas at particular times often indicate that 
decentralization does not necessarily tend towards less progressive social policy and that the 
federal government, at times, exerts its ever enlarging influence on social policy, even to the 
point of provoking provincial retribution for the federal encroachment. If federalism 
generates lower levels of social provision in a mature democracy, such a dynamic may 
operate quite differently in a democratizing country.
2
 Even in a mature democracy, 
federalism may precipitate more progressive social policy at the incipient phase of particular 
programs, but such tendencies dissipate as the programs mature. Moreover, different 
dynamics between federalism and social welfare policy operate, depending on the historical 
context. Therefore, it is indispensable to recognize that “earlier events matter … hence 
different sequences may produce different outcomes … history matters” (Pierson 2000: 253). 
 
2.2. Federalism and Labor Market Policy 
 
A similar argument-counterargument can be made with the relationship between 
federalism and labor market policy, especially in conjunction with more exposure to global 
market. Nevertheless, it is equally noteworthy that such a modest commitment to labor 
market policy — as well as social welfare policy — is arguably an outcome of reinforcement 
by political institutions, federalism to note foremost. For example, both federal and 
provincial governments may be heavily involved in social policy, which can result in 
duplication, complexity, and/or waste (Haddow 2003: 244-245; Boychuck 2003: 270-272). 
If multiple levels of government contest over jurisdiction of social policy, often largely 
out of political purpose, both employers and employees are reluctant to invest in specific 
skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 150-153).
3
 Especially in tight labor markets, employers 
                                                          
2 As I will examine in details later in case of Canada, federal cost-sharing initially led to a higher level 
in social provision because provinces could afford more than their fiscal capacity allowed. Yet federal 
intervention did not necessarily ensure a continuously generous social policy. As provincial 
resentment of federal encroachment grew intense, the federal government’s claim on pan-Canadian 
comparability lost its glamour and the demand to enhance regional/local communities reinforced the 
needs to strengthen regional/local identities. 
3 Citing Aoki, Estevez-Abe et al. argue that firm-specific skills, since they are worthless outside that 
specific firm, necessitate a high level of employment protection, or institutionalized employment 
security. Contrarily, industry-specific skills, as workers can move between companies within the 
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prefer a uniform, national social insurance system to competitive social benefits such that 
costs and risks are shared through a universalistic social insurance (Iversen 2005: 6-11).
4
 
Given that a comprehensive and coordinated approach to skill formation is difficult to attain 
in division of powers, a federal government may strive to simplify the delivery of the 
relevant programs by reducing contradictory and overlapping policy objectives (Lightman 
and Riches 2000: 45-63). Moreover, a federal government may be tempted to broaden its 
claim on education, which is formerly assigned to subnational jurisdiction, in expectation of 
improving the national economic performance in a global market. 
However, such an effort on the part of the federal government often faces a stiff and 
severe scrutiny on several grounds. First, federal-subnational governmental relations are 
often laden with a legacy of intergovernmental rivalry, if not hostility, and inefficiency, 
largely reflecting historical and/or societal complexities. Second, related to the first point, 
both levels of government are involved in specific social policy largely because a respective 
order of government has a legitimate interest in the concerned policy field, which makes it 
virtually impossible to give up. Third, any unilateral attempt to streamline specific social 
policy-making and/or its administration typically runs short of accomplishing the goal, often 
due to the ambivalence in federal government’s aim. Fourth, related to the third point, when 
both orders of government remain actively involved in the concerned policy field and there 
exists a very limited coordination between them for various reasons, each level of 
government tends to insist on its legitimate role through subsequent unilateral changes in 
other areas as well. 
 
2.3. Federalism and Employment-Welfare Relationship 
 
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) present an indirect measure of social protection on the basis of 
the composite indices in various countries, both federal and unitary.
5
 By using those figures, 
I constructed Figure 1 that juxtaposes employment and unemployment protection in 7 federal 
states.
6
 Figure 1 confirms that countries do group into different categories, roughly 
corresponding to Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ even among 
                                                                                                                                                      
industry, require wage protection, or an institutional mechanism to protect wages, especially skilled 
wages from market fluctuations. For more details on company-specific skills and employment 
protection, refer to Osterman (1987 46-67), Schettkat (1993: 153-170).   
4 As opposed to the ‘power resources model of the welfare state’ that hypothesizes the welfare state 
imposing on an unwilling business and equates welfare capitalism with decommodification, an 
alternative approach to the welfare state proposes that enterprises, when exposed to risks, favor a 
progressive social protection, which essentially encourages the acquisition of skills, thus enhancing 
the competitiveness of the firms in international markets. For more details, refer to Swenson (2002), 
Mares (2003).  
5  Measures pertaining to employment protection include employment protection legislation (EPL), 
collective dismissals protection, and company-based protection. Meanwhile, measures pertaining to 
unemployment protection include net unemployment replacement rates, generosity of unemployment 
benefits, and definition of ‘suitable’ jobs in the administration of unemployment benefits to the 
unemployed. For specifics on each measure and its limitation, refer to Estevez-Abe et al (2001: 168, 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, p. 165). 
6 7 federal states are Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (Canada), Germany 
(GER), Switzerland (SWI), and USA. 




federal states (Esping-Andersen 1990).
7
 Based on this social protection scheme, Estevez-Abe 
et al. predict skill profiles and propose a ‘welfare production regime’ as a critical institution 
linking the welfare state and the production regime. Iversen (2005) furthers this argument by 
augmenting “a politics of markets” that is supposed to model how social protection affects 






















Conventional reinterpretation of the welfare state is confined to explaining the observed 
complementarity between social welfare policy and labor market policy, which tends to 
repeat and even strengthen its pattern because rational employers and employees support 
policies that ensure reasonably sufficient returns and steer government towards their 
preferred path. In this paper, I propose that historical experiences intertwined with 
institutionalized inter-governmentalism make difference in conditioning the relationship 
between social welfare policy and labor market policy. Even if a determined government sets 
out to transfigure social welfare policy to boost product market, which both employers and 
employees support, the extant complementarity between the welfare state and production 
regime remains intact despite purposive efforts to transform it, primarily because 
institutionalized experiences of intergovernmental relations obstruct such transformation 
endeavors. In other words, social welfare policy and labor market policy are likely to 
maintain their complementarity even when employers, employees, and government strive to 
steer clear from it, precisely because they often can hardly stay clear from the institutional 
                                                          
7 Arts and Gelissen (2002: 145-146) argue that there is an additional category, labeled “the Antipodes,” 
to which Australia and New Zealand belong because of their higher and more inclusive level of social 
protection. However, Figure 1 fails to exhibit this subtle difference, probably because the index of 
unemployment protection is in itself a composite measure. 
8  Iversen (2005: 8-9) claims that his approach to the welfare production regime “reconciles the 
controversy between the power resources perspective and the new employer-focused approaches, and 
it also links the study of the welfare state to recent work on the importance of democratic institutions 
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and historical contexts. 
In the following section, I will illustrate my argument by delineating a seemingly 
contradictory legacy in Canada of integrating labor market policy and social welfare policy 
into youth employment policy. For that purpose, I will link research on the relationship 
between federalism and welfare, on the one hand, with works on the relationship between 
welfare and capitalism, on the other hand, by building on Iversen (2005) who argues that 
social protection can improve or undermine the operation of markets. The key puzzle, then, 
lies in specifying under which conditions state may complement or hinder market. In this 
paper, I focus on the historical contexts behind Canada’s youth employment policy to 
scrutinize how federalism has exerted its influence on the relationship between social 
welfare policy and labor market policy, and why the final outcome is as it is — or if there is 
any other way to go around. In doing so, I hope to make a meager contribution to the study 
of federalism and welfare capitalism, and eventually to build a systematic model to account 
for the variation in the extent to which federalism affects the employment-welfare 
relationship in future study. 
 
 
3. INTEGRATING SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND ACTIVE LABOR MARKET 
POLICY INTO YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICY IN CANADA 
 
3.1. Intergovernmental Jurisdiction over Social Policy in Canada 
 
Canada’s constitution codifies that provinces have sole responsibility for education, thus 
a federal department of education is lacking in Canada.
9
 Training, in contrast, is not 
specifically assigned to any particular level of government. Because education and training 
are basically investments in human resources development, provincial governments have 
been deeply involved in its provision. On the part of the federal government, training and the 
labor market are presumed to be closely connected and the constitution stipulates that the 
federal government should be in charge of macroeconomic policy, thus justifying its claim 
on active labor market policy, training in particular and education in general.
10
 A 
fundamental challenge to the political system practicing multi-level governance, then, is 
about designing and coordinating division of labor. Or is it? 
Since the 1960s, the supply-side neo-liberal interpretation of unemployment has replaced 
the demand-side Keynesian interpretation and Canada was no exception. Accordingly, there 
have been distinctive demands for different labor market policies, which required different 
roles of the state, which, in turn, employed different instruments, shifting from dependency 
on state-provided social policies to the initiatives to promote the market operation. This 
remarkable shift, in fact, signifies a striking break with the past 30-year pattern in which the 
                                                          
9 Section 93. Moreover, section 92 authorizes provinces to be in charge of social assistance, which 
purports to achieve welfare-to-work. Federal government manages to intervene in an ostensibly 
provincial jurisdiction of social assistance based on its spending power and its jurisdiction in personal 
taxation. 
10 Especially since World War II, the federal government claimed its responsibility for the macro-
economy. Through a national approach to active labor market policy, the federal government is 
argued to be better qualified to foster labor mobility and to correct inter-provincial discrepancies in 
labor market infrastructure (Haddow 2003: 245). 




federal government even encroached on the provincial jurisdiction of responsibility in 
education, training, and social assistance. 
Despite its keen interest in improving the human capital and promoting its 
competitiveness with foreign counterparts, the Canadian federal government appeared to 
commit fewer resources to labor market policy measures, both active (ALMP) and passive 
(PLMP).
11
 Some even argued that Canada, being a market-oriented English-speaking nation, 
left technical skill formations entirely to the free market and instead invested in liberal arts 
university education — or more pertinent to ALMP, student loans and grants (Klassen 2001: 
163). 
Thus Canada belongs to a liberal trajectory in which it ranks low on the degree of 
decommodification (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 162-169; Goodin 2001: 20; Huber and 
Stephens 2001: 85-112; Art and Glissen 2002: 141).
12
 
Canada’s labor market policy indeed illuminates how and why conscientious efforts in 
social policy by the federal government only prolong a traditional welfare-production nexus. 
Labor market policy, despite its potential for the much coveted social union in Canada while 
reducing a chronically high unemployment rate at the same time, often runs short of 
fulfilling its much anticipated role for various reasons, both accountable from the demand- 
and supply-side perspectives.
13
 Additionally, Canada has relied on immigration to address 
skills shortages in the labor force, thus investing insufficiently in training.
14
  
What is noteworthy in Canada is that government, business, and labor shunned on-the-
job training and relied on institutional training for different reasons. There was little 
incentive for the private sector to pay for on-the-job training because “it does not pay.” First, 
both business and labor organizations are highly decentralized and fragmented such that no 
                                                          
11 In Canada, passive labor market policy (PLMP) measures include Employment Insurance (EI) and 
social assistance, which are basically income support during unemployment. Active labor market 
policy (ALMP) measures are institutional training in community colleges, apprenticeship/on-the-job 
training, job creation either by direct employment or through incentives to employers, counseling to 
prospective job seekers, and data collection and its dissemination, thus helping individuals to enter/re-
enter the workforce and/or increase their earning capacity. 
12 The degree of decommodification refers to the degree to which social provision is deemed to be a 
matter of right, thus a degree to which an individual is capable of livelihood without market reliance. 
The second dimension signifies the kind of social stratification and its ramification on solidarities. 
13 Since the 1960s, the unemployment rate in Canada at 7.4 percent has been significantly higher than 
the average in other OECD countries at 5.2 percent and remained persistently higher (OECD. 
Historical Statistics, 1960-1994). Then in 1994, the Labour Market Development Agreement 
(LMDA) finally emerged both to improve the individual access to employment and enhance the 
operation of labor market. Nevertheless, even among the so-called ‘liberal’ welfare production regime, 
Canada’s unemployment rate at 7.6 percent (8.0 for men and 7.2 for women) stands higher than the 
US’ 6.0 percent (6.3 for men and 5.7 for women) or Australia’s 5.7 percent (5.6 for men and 5.8 for 
women) in 2003 (Canadian Statistics: Labour force characteristics by age and sex, Canada and 
selected countries http://www.statcan.ca/10I01/cst01/labor23a.htm) 
14 Active labor market policies consist of information provision, job training, and subsidized/created 
employment. Canadian ALMP was riddled with insufficient investment for various reasons as 
described above (Klassen 2000: 161). Consequently, even after the LMDA was adopted, Canada 
ranked at the lower bottom in expenditures on labor market measures, both active and passive (OECD. 
1998. Employment Outlook). 
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single umbrella organization represents all members, not to mention pursuing a uniform 
ALMP objective.
15
 A large majority of workers are not unionized,
16
 except for public sector 
unions.
17
 Second, since labor law is under provincial jurisdiction, organized labor has largely 
focused on provincial politics and ignored the federal government’s initiatives in ALMP. 
Additionally since 1960, the leftist control of government — namely the Liberal party —
lasting from 1963 through 1978 (Lester Pearson 1963,1965; Pierre Trudeau 1968, 1972,  
1974), from 1980 through 1984 (Pierre Trudeau 1980; John Turner 1984), and from 1993 
through 2005 (Jean Chrétien 1993, 1997, 2000; Paul Martin 2004) has not been particularly 
associated with the accentuated expansion in training.
18
 Although the federal government’s 
funds in training increased, such increases often occurred under the Conservative rule. 
Furthermore, even though the federal government claimed its commitment to inter-
provincial equity in training provision and expanded its involvement, its grip over provincial 
discretion on fund distribution often slipped away, regardless of partisanship. 
Interestingly, the federal involvement in training expenditures became extensive in 1960 
only when the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act (TVTAA) was legislated 
under the Conservative watch. Even though the federal government funded half or more of 
the provincial training programs through the TVTAA, training programs in more affluent 
provinces expanded rapidly while those in less affluent provinces remained unaffected. Thus 
in 1966 under the Liberal watch, the federal government replaced the TVTAA with the 
Adult Occupational Training Act (AOTA), which covered practically all training costs as the 
federal government purchased courses relevant to training. Despite the Pearson cabinet’s 
effort to use the federal employment service offices in selecting candidates and identifying 
sites for training, provincial governments successfully wrestled to ascertain that most of 
training funded by the AOTA took place in their own community colleges through 
intergovernmental negotiations. This provincial inclination clearly did not meet the federal 
government’s specific demands for training to meet skill shortages. Yet it took nearly two 
decades until a new legislation, the National Training Act (NTA), replaced the AOTA under 






                                                          
15 The Canadian Labour Congress and several provincial labour federations, in particular in Quebec and 
Newfoundland although trade unionism and labor movements were curtailed, do exert significant 
political influence (Robinson, Ian 2003: 220-221). 
16 On average, union densities have steadily declined since the 1980s and currently run around 30 
percent of total labor participation population (Statistics Canada, 2005, Historical Labour Force 
Statistics). 
17 They opposed on-the-job training because vocational training would replace institutional training, 
which threatened the employment of their union members, mostly teachers and instructors at 
community colleges (Klassen 2000: 160). 
18 Since 1960, Conservatives came to power in 1962 (John Diefenbaker), 1979 (Joe Clark), 1984 (Brian 
Mulroney), 1988 (Brian Mulroney), 1993 (Kim Campbell), and 2006 (Stephen Harper).  
19 Despite a series of legislative efforts to reassert federal control by creating a Skills Growth Fund and 
expanding funds for on-the-job training to the private sector, provincial governments managed to 
attenuate federal ‘encroachment’ upon their jurisdiction at the federal expense. For more details, refer 
to Noel (2000). 




3.2. Integrating Social Welfare Policy with Active Labor Market Policy Targeting 
Youth: 1982-1997 
 
Figure 2 compares national unemployment rate with youth employment rate since 1982 
through 1997. This 15-year trend carries different political implications by specific period, 
so I will divide it into three portions: 1982-1989, 1990-1992, and 1993-1997. 
 
Figure 2. National Unemployment and Youth Unemployment Rate, 1982-1997 
 
       Trudeau (L)  Turner (L)   Mulroney 1 (C)                   Mulroney 2 (C)   Campbell (C)      Chrétien (L)    
 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998) 
 
 
First, between 1982 when the NTA replaced the AOTA and 1989 when another policy 
reform  the Labour Force Development Strategy (LFDS)  was launched, both national 
and youth unemployment rate steadily declined, with the latter at a steeper rate than the 
former. Second, this trend reversed, however, since 1990 onward and both unemployment 
rates increased, with the youth unemployment rate arising much more rapidly, during the 
second Mulroney administration. Third, in 1993 general election, the Liberal Party 
consequently reclaimed its throne and promised a national program for apprenticeship, an 
employment initiative for youth, and an effort to increase workplace training. Nevertheless, 
this so-called “Red Book” did not survive long because of the fiscal graveness and Quebec’s 
insistence upon the provision of employment services.
20
 Accordingly, the federal 
                                                          
20 During the 1993 general election, the federal Liberal Party’s platform was referred to as the “Red 
Book,” which enlisted ALMP as one of its most focused policy area. For more specifics, refer to 
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government transferred responsibilities for training purchases to provinces, while retaining 
employment services provision and labor market information dissemination through the 
restructured Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC).
21
 Furthermore, the federal 
government reduced the renamed Employment Insurance (EI) benefits and overhauled the 
job creation and training measures funded by the EI in anticipation of transforming the 
federal-provincial distribution of responsibilities.
22
 The Chrétien administration eventually 
witnessed a decline in both rates, although there were sporadic increases in youth 
unemployment rate in 1997 and 1998. 
 
3.2.1. The First Mulroney Administration: Depriving Provincial Involvement in ALMP 
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1984 after a brief stint by the Liberals, the 
Mulroney administration was determined to curtail federal involvement in the labor market, 
reducing its role in direct job creation and training purchases,
23
 but retaining employment 
services through the Canada Employment Centres, and the collection, analysis and 
distribution of labor market information and research. Unlike its predecessors, the newly 
adopted Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS) targeted “at risk” individuals who had little labor 
market prospects, which meant that provincial involvement in the “indirect” part of job 
creation and training spending was halved.
24
 By redirecting the money from community 
colleges to private-sector actors, however, the federal government alienated provincial 
governments in the ALMP field, which was further manifested by the Labour Force 
Development Strategy (LFDS) to assist workers displaced by the Free Trade Agreement in 
readjusting to the labor market. Thus, a steady decline in unemployment rate was arguably 
achieved at the cost of intergovernmental relations. 
 
3.2.2. The Second Mulroney Administration: Aggravating Provincial Distrust of Federal 
Initiatives  
What is noteworthy about the Labour Force Development Strategy (LFDS) in 
comparison with the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS), in particular, is that 1) the federal 
government increasingly derived funds for training and job creation from the Unemployment 
                                                          
21 The Canada Employment Centres (CEC) were not only renamed but also reduced in their number to 
save maintenance costs. 
22 When the Unemployment Insurance (UI) was renamed the Employment Insurance (EI), the job 
creation and training measures funded from the EI budget were regrouped into 1) targeted wage 
subsidies to employers, 2) self-employment assistance to individuals, 3) job-creation partnerships to 
community organizations, 4) skills development/skills loans and grants to individuals, and 5) targeted 
earnings supplements to the EI claimants with low-wage jobs. Of these 5 components, 4)skills loans 
and grants were related to training, while the other 4 were related to job creation.  
23  The Mulroney administration launched the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS), which integrated job 
creation with federal training purchases. Through its emphasis on market-relevant spending on 
training, the Mulroney administration managed to reduce overall federal spending (Haddow 2003: 
248). 
24 Provincial government retained its influence over “direct” spending on job creation and training such 
that they kept pouring funds to community colleges. In the meantime, the federal government, in 
charge of the “indirect” spending, signed contracts with individual firms, private-sector trainers, or 
private-sector groups and even delegated some decision-making responsibilities to private-sector 
committees. The CJS, like its predecessors, was funded from the federal Consolidated Revenue Fund. 




Insurance (UI), and that 2) the beneficiaries of this federal money had been employed until 
recently, thus qualitatively different from the “at risk” individuals targeted by the CJS. Such 
shifts in federal emphasis forced provincial governments to redirect their attention away 
from their “at risk” clients to the federal clients who would otherwise return to the labor 
market anyway. Because the expanding UI funds were “indirect” spending, provincial 
governments had little influence over their expenditure, which was further aggravated by the 
declining share of “direct” spending on provincial community colleges. Furthermore, 3) the 
creation of the Canadian Labour Force Development Board (CLFDB), included in the LFDS, 
imposed a corporatist decision-making in ALMP upon provincial governments.
25
 Given that 
jurisdiction over ALMP is divided between different levels of government, however, a multi-
layered board of training funded by the federal government provoked provincial suspicion 
that the federal government was trying to intervene in provincial ALMP decision-making. 
Combined with the shift in the source and target of federal training spending, the newly 
proposed national training board of a three-tier system was the last blow to provincial 
governments.
26
 The federal unilateralism in pursuing market-oriented ALMP not only failed 
to reduce unemployment rate but also aggravated provincial distrust of the federal initiatives 
in ALMP. 
 
3.2.3. The Chrétien Administration: ‘Devolution Revolution’ à la Canada Gone Awry 
By 1992, unemployment rate climbed up to the 1984 level and the federal-provincial 
relations turned from worse to worst. Irritated by unilateral federalism, many provinces, 
especially Quebec, argued for a transfer of responsibility in ALMP, contesting that the 
federal control over labor market policy deterred an adequate integration due to the close 
link between social and economic development. However, the Charlottetown Accord on 
constitutional reform regarding jurisdiction over labor market adjustment policy got defeated 
in a national referendum and a provisional agreement on program transfer responsibilities to 
provinces was nullified when the Liberals swept the 1993 general election.
27
 However, the 
Chrétien administration soon discovered that they, too, were faced with the same demand for 
the withdrawal of the federal government from “training,” one of the main components in 
ALMP. The Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995 exacerbated the urgency to 
transform the social welfare policy and labor market policy regime. 
By the 1990s, the conventional demand-driven policy to reduce unemployment, i.e. the 
traditional Keynesian approach to labor market dominant since the 1970s, became obsolete 
such that the federal involvement in job creation was curtailed.
28
 Witnessing that such an 
                                                          
25 Convinced that the corporatist forms of policy-making in which business and labor representatives 
were brought together produced a greater commitment to training as seen in several European 
countries, the second Mulroney administration launched a national training board, consisting of 
business, labor and other non-governmental representatives in 1991. 
26 Eventually, the CLFDB was terminated in 1999. For more details, refer to Sharpe and Haddow, eds., 
(1997). 
27 By reaching a provisional agreement rather than a constitutional codification, the federal government 
ensured that responsibilities of labor market policy would be transferred to provinces on a de facto 
manner. 
28 The labor market policy in Canada evolved through 4 periods of regime changes: 1) limited federal 
actions until the mid-1960s, 2) increased federal intervention through the late 1980s, 3) a corporatist 
attempt to create a national training board through the mid-1990s, and 4) a neo-liberal approach to 
 OKYEON YI 84 
 
approach to unemployment fails to resolve an epidemic, the federal government instead 
stressed training as an economic issue to be addressed nationwide. However, the federal 
government’s unilateral actions in the 1980s spurred provincial governments to demand for a 
complete transfer of all active labor market programs, including training. Additionally, the 
federal government became increasingly committed to smaller government so that provincial 
governments found it easier to argue for devolution in ALMP. 
 
Figure 3. Federal ALMP Expenditures (million $), 1993-2000 
        Source: Klassen (2001: 171, Table 3) 
 
 
Alongside reforms in labor market policy but independent of them, social welfare policy 
underwent its share of reform, including funds for ALMP to be transferred to provinces. Yet 
all these devolution measures were conceived by the Finance Department whose primary 
motive was to reduce federal government expenditure rather than to enhance the 
employability of individuals, as evidenced from a declining total ALMP expenditures in 
Figure 3.
29
 Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that funds for ALMP decreasingly came from CRF 
and increasingly from UI/EI, in which most of expenditures were paid to individuals 
engaged in training or for purchasing training rather than for work-sharing, job creation, etc. 
Given that UI/EI funds could not serve CRF clients and CRF funds declined over the years, 
provincial government felt constrained in providing social assistance to those unemployable 
                                                                                                                                                      
labor market through devolution. Under the market-oriented paradigm, active labor market policy 
aimed to make labor market function like commodity market so that it is imperative to strip away 
work disincentives such as collective bargaining or unemployment benefits. Accordingly, the current 
ALMP strives to integrate social welfare policy with labor market policy by investing in skills 
development/investment in human capital for higher wages, on the one hand, and encouraging low-
wage employment to relieve labor shortage on the other. 
29 In terms of constant price, total ALMP expenditures were stagnant between 1993 and 1998, but 
dropped thereafter. Interestingly, the amount earmarked for educational grants and loans steadily 
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such as persons with disabilities, single parents with young children, or older workers. 
Consequently, provincial governments shifted their emphasis to the programs for youth. 
 
3.3. Youth Employment Policy in the Post-Chrétien Canada: Federal-Provincial 
Rift over Youth 
 
Since the 1990s, many provinces have been attempting to integrate labor market policy 
and education policy with social welfare policy in accordance with the neo-liberal paradigm. 
Regarding social welfare policy, there has been a drastic shift to a “welfare-to-work” 
approach to the unemployable whose benefits would be reduced if they fail to return to the 
labor market with active labor market measures. Moreover, social welfare policy focused 
more state support on individuals “most in need but least responsible for their condition,” i.e. 
youth.
30
 Accordingly, education policy shifted toward providing skills that enable youth to 
make a smooth transition from school to work.  
Especially since the recession in the 1990s, youth participation rate in the labor market 
fell below the national average. Especially because the percentage of youth in total 
population actually decreased, this declining youth employment rate does not result from a 
demographic change (McBride and Stoyko in McIntosh 2001: 212). Furthermore, of the 
young people working, young full-time workers are shrinking. All these findings indicate 
 
Figure 4. Labor Force and Participation Rates by Age Group, 2001-2005 
Source: http://www40.statcan.ca/I01/cst01/labor05.htm (Statistics Canada. CANSIM. Table 282-0002) 
                                                          
30 According to this rationale, people in their prime age of work are considered to be responsible for 
their unemployment so that social assistance should be limited and contingent on their ability to return 
to work in a reasonable time. Contrarily, helping poor children/youth was deemed desirable even 
though attacking the assistance to poor adults or families to whom those poor children/youth belonged 
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Figure 5. Full-time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment by Age Group,  
2001-2005 
 
Source: http://www40.statcan.ca/I01/cst01/labor12.htm (Statistics Canada. CANSIM. Table 282-0002) 
 
 
that young people are faced with the labor market that is not accommodating to their urgent 
needs. Therefore, even after the economy recovers and more jobs are offered to the youth, 
many young people are still working part-time involuntarily despite their willingness to work 
full-time as seen in Figure 4 and 5. 
It is a common sense that the young people have to deal with unique challenges when 
looking for a job, especially in the depressed labor market. It is also widely known that 
politicians and policymakers neither target all segments of youth nor contemplate all 
approaches to youth employment policy. Recently a specific type of policy in accordance 
with a neo-liberal framework has become dominant, even though its record shows a rather 
disappointing outcome.
31
 It is intriguing, then, that the young people and graduating students 
only recently became the primary target of labor market policy, both at the federal and 
provincial levels. Yet precisely because youth employment policy was formulated for 
complex reasons, it has often been operated at cross-purposes in Canada. 
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) claim that vocational training is weak in liberal countries, 
including Canada, which can be suggested by the shorter length of enterprise tenure and the 
more restrictive unemployment benefits. Iversen (2005) argues that certain “politics of 
markets” ensures that social protection does not hinder the operation of markets while other 
kinds get in the way and aggravate the welfare-production trade-off even more. Youth 
                                                          
31 As seen in Figure 5, the gap in full-time employment rate between the national average and the youth 
population remained unchanged. Moreover, full-time employment rate among the young people 





















employment policy — and labor market policy in a broader sense — in Canada illustrates 
that purposive “politics of markets” indeed ensures to prolong the aforementioned liberal 
welfare production regime. An intriguing puzzle in Canada, then, is that such a tendency 
remains intact even after a particular order of government was determined to transform the 
existing liberal regime by restructuring social welfare policy and labor market policy. 
Indeed, youth employment policy in the context of labor market policy shows that neither 
the demand-side nor the supply-side perspective fully accounts for the welfare-production 
regime formation in Canada. To explain the complete mechanism in the observed nexus, I 
concur with Iversen that a political institution and its historical path need to be investigated. 
Intergovernmental relations in Canada are uniquely complex and contentious issues.
32
 
Combined with complexities involving youth and employment policy, it is not difficult to 
imagine that boundary problems are abundantly found in this particular field of labor market 
policy. For instance, Table 1 illuminates how complicated it is just to define the category of 
youth in consensus among all provinces, and between the federal and provincial 
governments. 
 
Table 1. Minimum and Maximum Ages of Youth by Jurisdiction, 1998 
 
Prov       10          15          20          25         30        35 
NS                         17-----------24 
MB                   15----------------24 
SK                         17--------------25 
AL                   15----------------24 
NB                   15----------------24 
NF                      16---------------------27 
PE                      16--------------------------30 
ON                   15-------------------25-------30* 
BC                   15----------------------------30 
QC                      16--------------------------30--------36* 
CAN 16----------------------------31 
* Special maximums for entrepreneurial program (in Quebec, “young farmers”) 
Source: McBride (2001: 218, Figure 4) 
 
More substantively, the young people can be divided into at least 4 different groups: 1) 
disadvantaged/marginalized youth (ex. members of Aboriginal communities, youth with 
disabilities), 2) “at risk”/ “vulnerable” youth (ex. high-school dropouts, absentee students), 
3) “young achievers”/ “advanced youth” (ex. young people with high-level aptitudes or 
above-average career prospects), and 4) “young offenders” (ex. young people who 
committed crimes). Corresponding to its specific needs to prioritize certain groups of youth, 
government spending on youth employment programs also differs significantly among 
provinces, and between the federal and provincial level, depending on the target group as 
seen in Figure 6. 
                                                          
32  Gagnon and Erk (2002:328) contend that “in multinational societies with deep divisions some 
ambiguity is necessary for the smooth functioning of the system [since] there are core differences 
about the nature of the political community and no solution to the debate as to whether Canada is a 
community of 10 provinces or two nations.” 
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Figure 6. Spending on Youth Employment Programs by Jurisdiction and Target Group, 
1998. 
1. SK and AL include general programs applicable to youth. 
2. The category of “others” refers to young people who did not complete post-secondary education in  
NF, and young farmers in QC. 
Source: Inventory of Canada’s Youth Employment Programs and Services (Rev. NN. 1998); quoted by 
McBride and Stoyko (2001: 231, Table 6) 
 
Moreover, the nature of school-to-work transitions has changed so that the traditional 
sequence from secondary education, to post-secondary education, and eventually to full-time 
employment is no longer a standard norm. As full-time employment is increasingly absent 
for many young people, they go through various transition paths. Additionally, even during 
their participation in the labor market, they are increasingly pressured into upgrading their 
skills on a regular basis so as to reduce their vulnerability to market volatility. All these 
recent changes resulted in longer transitions and more diverse — and often repetitive —
transition paths such that a clean break from school to work has become ever more difficult. 
To attenuate such difficulties, it was agreed among different levels of government to provide 
three categories of youth policies: 1) (re)employment services (recruiting, counseling, 
collecting and distributing information), 2) direct employment creation (public sector 
employment, employment subsidies to employers, self-employment support), and 3) work 
experience programs (internship, mentorship, work study, work exposure, volunteer).
33
 
Depending on the types of programs that each jurisdiction is inclined to offer, however, the 
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As a result, there is considerable unevenness in the types and targets of youth programs. 
Additionally, less affluent provinces tend to offer fewer programs than more affluent provinces 
do. Besides, there is very little coordination among provinces such that there is no standard for 
comparability even in collecting and distributing information pertinent to employment. But 
most of all, most of youth programs are heavily concentrated on low-cost initiatives. All 
these problems point to the plain fact that some measures of inter-jurisdictional equalization 
and inter-level promulgation of responsibilities, both functional and financial, are necessary 
to assure the provision of programs at the similarly sufficient level. 
Nevertheless, the current state of federal-provincial relations in the field of youth 
employment policy is not only extremely complex, but also in transition and often bitterly 
contentious. Basically, intergovernmentalism in youth employment policy consist of three 
distinct and often separate tracks: 1) bilateral cooperation/consultation (ex. the Canada-New 
Brunswick Federal/Provincial Youth Services Partnership Initiative), 2) a pan-Canadian 
strategy (ex. the Forum of Labour Market Ministers, the Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Partnership on Youth Employment), and 3) social union negotiations/procedural guidelines 
in establishing new programs (ex. A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians). 
When both bilateral and multilateral components are juxtaposed as in the case of youth 
employment policy, there is a risk of unilateralism proclaimed by disgruntled provinces 
and/or the irate Ottawa. 
The problem is that any solution to the current entanglement is double-edged. If the 
federal government is excessively intent on reducing fiscal deficit and cutting down transfers 
to the provinces, provinces tend to argue for more control over policy. At the same time, as 
the provincial governments also strive to reduce deficits by discriminating against out-of-
jurisdiction clients, the federal government is compelled to exercise unilateral control over 
national standards more coercively and frequently. Accordingly, youth policy is in a constant 
fluctuation even if the federal government devolves its policy claim — or more precisely, a 
small fraction of it — to assuage provincial grievances. In fact, any form of devolution 
without a minutely articulated division of labor across different levels of governments only 







Starting from 1996, the federal government agreed to devolve its responsibilities in labor 
market policy through the Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDA). Along with 
funds, the federal government also agreed to transfer personnel to the provinces. Many 
provinces opted for a complete devolution while others contemplated less than full-scale 
devolution, namely co-management and strategic partnership, as seen in Table 2. 
However, the federal government refused to devolve its role in youth employment 
programs as well as programs for members of First Nations and the disabled, mainly for 
                                                          
34 For specifics on youth employment “flagship initiatives” and the lead department in charge, refer to 
McBride and Stoyko (2001: 227, Table 4). For specifics on general categories of youth program by 
jurisdiction, refer to McBride and Stoyko (2001: 229, Table 5). 
35 Thus Haddow (2003: 262) concludes that federal-provincial relations remain “messy as always!”  
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political reasons to retain some visibility as a national government in the arguably important 
 
Table 2. LMDA Chronology and Type of Agreement, 2006 
 
Province Date of agreement Date of implementation Type of agreement 
NS 4-24-1997 4-24-1997 Strategic partnership 
MB 4-17-1997 11-27-1998 Full transfer 
SK 2-6-1998 1-1-1999 Full transfer 
AL 12-6-1996 11-1-1997 Full transfer 
NB 12-13-1996 10-1-1997 Full transfer 
NF 3-24-1997 3-24-1997 Co-management 
PE 4-26-1997 4-26-1997 Co-management 
ON 11-23-2005 1-1-2007 Full transfer 
BC* 4-25-1997 4-25-1997 Co-management 
QC 4-21-1997 4-1-1998 Full transfer 
*Negotiations for a full transfer agreement failed to emerge in BC till now. 
Source: http://www11.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/pls/edd/lmda.main (Evaluation and Data Development. Labour 
Market Development Agreement Series) 
 
 
field. Prompted by such political factors, especially when the governing party at the federal 
level differed from — thus even detests or resents — the opposition party controlling 
provincial governments, there was even less cooperation/coordination forged between two 
orders of governments.
36
 Moreover, the federal government was keenly aware of public 
support for the federal involvement — and even to the brink of encroaching upon provincial 
turfs — in youth employment to enhance education opportunities as a shield against 
economic insecurity.  
Yet youth employment policy — if it purported to resolve the recent problems associated 
with the labor market challenges to the young people — can be argued to transcend 
conventional division of labor between different levels of government. Precisely because the 
discrete jurisdictions were lacking, both federal and provincial governments were called 
upon to coordinate their initiatives. To allay the provincial antipathy, the federal government 
has made devolution offers, yet at the same time, it has reasserted its role. In the end, when 
provincial governments remained significantly active and the federal government exhibited 
the aforementioned discordant tendencies, there was very little prospect of coordination. 
Federal-provincial relations in the ALMP area were characterized with complexities for 
many reasons. In this paper, I emphasized that the lack of intergovernmental coordination 
led to the inadequate ALMP policy because complexities in federalism intertwined with the 
Canadian history of building “one state, two nations.”
37
 By examining the ALMP and youth 
employment policy, I addressed to the question of “How and why the welfare production 
regime in Canada is ‘liberal’.” The conventional explanations are that rational employers and 
                                                          
36 For example, it took almost 10 years for the LMDA to be signed between the Ontario provincial 
government and the federal government. 
37 For details, refer to Douglas (1986: 149-171). 




employees, to ensure their returns from investment in specific skills, support specific policies 
and steer the government towards the path to enhance their preferences. Yet such an account 
is incomplete in explaining how and why the existing complementarity between the welfare 
state and production regime remains more or less the same even if government is determined 
to transform the current welfare production regime by restructuring and reorganizing social 
welfare policy and labor market policy. I argue that it is so not because employers and 
employees successfully steer the government towards their preferred policy path, but 
because the ongoing institutionalized experiences of intergovernmental relations get in the 
way of such a transformation scheme. In the end, government is obliged to resume — or at 
least express its will to return to — the status quo, thus the existing liberal welfare 
production regime remains intact to strengthen the kind of skill formation selected by 
employers and employees alike. 
In the future research, I intend to develop a systematic model that explains under which 
conditions government complements the operation of market under the condition of complex 
and interdependent federalism. This paper is a preliminary work to investigate several 
observed tendencies in Canada during the past 40 years. Building on the findings in this 
paper and Iversen’s theoretical argument, I hope to formulate a comparative model of 
federalism and its effect on the employment-welfare relationship, thus contributing to the 
study of “capitalism, democracy, and welfare” in political systems committed to the 
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